

Network Reconnaissance

**Prepared By:
Kazim Ali Obad**

Supervisor:

Anmar Mohammed

MOHAMMED .B. HASSAN

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LAB SCENARIO

You are a junior security analyst tasked with assessing the internal network for vulnerabilities. Your team lead has assigned you to perform a structured reconnaissance exercise against a known-vulnerable virtual machine (Metasploitable 2) at 192.168.100.46 from your Kali Linux attack station at 192.168.100.38. The goal is not exploitation — it is visibility. Before any attack can be launched, an attacker must first understand what is running on the target. Equally, the blue team must understand what reconnaissance looks like in logs so they can detect it.

1. RED TEAM — Structured Nmap reconnaissance to enumerate all live services



2. BLUE TEAM — Monitor logs, IDS alerts, and network flows to detect scanning activity



3. PURPLE TEAM — Compare what was done against what was detected; identify and close gaps

This exercise maps to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques T1046 (Network Service Discovery) and T1018 (Remote System Discovery). It represents the earliest phase of the cyber kill chain — reconnaissance — and forms the foundation for all subsequent offensive and defensive work.

Lab Environment

Network Topology	
Kali Linux (Attacker)	192.168.100.38
Metasploitable 2 (Target)	192.168.100.46
Network	192.168.100.0/24 — Isolated VM Network
Tools	Nmap, Wireshark, Zeek, RITA, Suricata, ndiff

SECTION 1 — RED TEAM: Nmap Reconnaissance

1.1 Objective

The red team phase involves a layered series of Nmap scans. Each scan type is chosen to answer a specific question: Is the host alive? What ports are open? What services are running? What operating system is in use? The results build a complete picture of the attack surface.

Recon Objectives	
Live Hosts	Confirm 192.168.100.46 is active and reachable
Open TCP Ports	Identify all listening TCP services
Open UDP Ports	Identify DNS, NFS, RPC and other UDP services
Service Versions	Determine exact software versions for vulnerability matching
Operating System	Fingerprint the OS for targeted attack planning

1.2 Host Discovery

Before performing any port scanning, the target host must first be confirmed as alive on the network. A ping scan (-sn) sends ICMP echo requests and TCP probes without scanning any ports. This confirms that 192.168.100.46 is reachable from the Kali machine at 192.168.100.38 before any further scanning begins. It is the least intrusive active check and produces no port-level noise in target logs.

```
sudo nmap -sn 192.168.100.46
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ sudo nmap -sn 192.168.100.46
[sudo] password for kali:
Starting Nmap 7.98 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-02-28 08:42 -0500
Nmap scan report for 192.168.100.46
Host is up (0.00062s latency).
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:71:14:98 (VMware)
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.66 seconds
```

Figure 1: Host Discovery — `sudo nmap -sn 192.168.100.46` confirming the target is alive

1.3 Basic TCP Connect Scan (-sT)

A TCP Connect scan completes the full three-way handshake for each probed port. Unlike a SYN scan . This scan type is more detectable since it generates complete connection entries in target logs, but it is useful as a baseline. This scan was saved to XML for later comparison with `ndiff`.

```
nmap -sT --top-ports 1000 192.168.100.46 -oA essential_scan
```

PORT	STATE	SERVICE
21/tcp	open	ftp
22/tcp	open	ssh
23/tcp	open	telnet
25/tcp	open	smtp
53/tcp	open	domain
80/tcp	open	http
111/tcp	open	rpcbind
139/tcp	open	netbios-ssn
445/tcp	open	microsoft-ds
512/tcp	open	exec
513/tcp	open	login
514/tcp	open	shell
1099/tcp	open	rmiregistry
1524/tcp	open	ingreslock
2049/tcp	open	nfs
2121/tcp	open	ccproxy-ftp
3306/tcp	open	mysql
5432/tcp	open	postgresql
5900/tcp	open	vnc
6000/tcp	open	X11
6667/tcp	open	irc
8009/tcp	open	ajp13
8180/tcp	open	unknown

Figure 2: TCP Connect Scan (-sT) — open ports identified on the target host

1.4 SYN Scan with Version and OS Detection (-sS -sV -O)

The SYN scan (half-open scan) sends TCP SYN packets without completing the handshake resulting in less log noise on the target than a Connect scan . Combined with -sV (version detection) and -O (OS fingerprinting), this is the most informative standard Nmap scan. The -A flag enables additional scripts and traceroute. Output is saved in all formats for archiving and comparison.

```
sudo nmap -sS -sV -O -A -T5 -p- --reason --max-retries 5 192.168.100.46 -oA essential_syn

└─$ sudo nmap -sS -sV -O -A -T5 -p- --reason --max-retries 5 192.168.100.46

[sudo] password for kali:
Starting Nmap 7.98 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-02-28 07:29 -0500
Nmap scan report for 192.168.100.46
Host is up, received arp-response (0.00076s latency).
Not shown: 65505 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE      REASON          VERSION
21/tcp    open  ftp          syn-ack ttl 64 vsftpd 2.3.4
| ftp-syst:
|   STAT:
| FTP server status:
|   Connected to 192.168.100.38
|   Logged in as ftp
|   TYPE: ASCII
|   No session bandwidth limit
|   Session timeout in seconds is 300
|   Control connection is plain text
|   Data connections will be plain text
|   vsFTPD 2.3.4 - secure, fast, stable
|_End of status
|_ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
22/tcp    open  ssh          syn-ack ttl 64 OpenSSH 4.7p1 Debian 8ubuntu1 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   1024 60:0f:cf:e1:c0:5f:6a:74:d6:90:24:fa:c4:d5:6c:cd (DSA)
|   2048 56:56:24:0f:21:1d:de:a7:2b:ae:61:b1:24:3d:e8:f3 (RSA)
```

Figure 3: SYN Scan Part 1

```
| 1024 60:0f:cf:e1:c0:5f:6a:74:d6:90:24:fa:c4:d5:6c:cd (DSA)
|_ 2048 56:56:24:0f:21:1d:de:a7:2b:ae:61:b1:24:3d:e8:f3 (RSA)
23/tcp open telnet syn-ack ttl 64 Linux telnetd
25/tcp open smtp syn-ack ttl 64 Postfix smtpd
|_ssl-date: 2026-02-25T04:33:19+00:00; -3d07h59m03s from scanner time.
|_ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=ubuntu804-base.localdomain/organizationName=OCOSA/stateOrProvinceName=There is n
o such thing outside US/countryName=XX
| Not valid before: 2010-03-17T14:07:45
|_Not valid after: 2010-04-16T14:07:45
|_sslv2:
| SSLv2 supported
|_ciphers:
| SSL2_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
| SSL2_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5
| SSL2_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5
| SSL2_RC4_128_WITH_MD5
| SSL2_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
|_ SSL2_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
|_smtp-commands: metasploitable.localdomain, PIPELINING, SIZE 10240000, VRFY, ETRN, STARTTLS, ENHANCEDSTATUSCODE
S, 8BITMIME, DSN
53/tcp open domain syn-ack ttl 64 ISC BIND 9.4.2
|_dns-nsid:
|_ bind.version: 9.4.2
80/tcp open http syn-ack ttl 64 Apache httpd 2.2.8 ((Ubuntu) DAV/2)
|_http-title: Metasploitable2 - Linux
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.2.8 (Ubuntu) DAV/2
```

Figure 4: SYN Scan Part 2

```
|_http-title: Metasploitable2 - Linux
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.2.8 (Ubuntu) DAV/2
111/tcp open rpcbind syn-ack ttl 64 2 (RPC #100000)
|_rpcinfo:
| program version port/proto service
| 100000 2 111/tcp rpcbind
| 100000 2 111/udp rpcbind
| 100003 2,3,4 2049/tcp nfs
| 100003 2,3,4 2049/udp nfs
| 100005 1,2,3 44917/tcp mountd
| 100005 1,2,3 54376/udp mountd
| 100021 1,3,4 50870/udp nlockmgr
| 100021 1,3,4 52765/tcp nlockmgr
| 100024 1 37888/udp status
| 100024 1 40331/tcp status
139/tcp open netbios-ssn syn-ack ttl 64 Samba smb 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
445/tcp open netbios-ssn syn-ack ttl 64 Samba smb 3.0.20-Debian (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
512/tcp open exec syn-ack ttl 64 netkit-rsh rexecd
513/tcp open login? syn-ack ttl 64
514/tcp open tcpwrapped syn-ack ttl 64
1099/tcp open java-rmi syn-ack ttl 64 GNU Classpath grmiregistry
1524/tcp open bindshell syn-ack ttl 64 Metasploitable root shell
2049/tcp open nfs syn-ack ttl 64 2-4 (RPC #100003)
2121/tcp open ftp syn-ack ttl 64 ProFTPD 1.3.1
3306/tcp open mysql syn-ack ttl 64 MySQL 5.0.51a-3ubuntu5
```

Figure 5: SYN Scan Part 3

1.5 UDP Scan (-sU)

UDP services are often overlooked in reconnaissance because they do not respond with a SYN/ACK like TCP does. This scan targets the top 50 UDP ports and identified several open services including DNS (53), rpcbind (111), NetBIOS-NS

(137), and NFS (2049). These services represent potential attack vectors that would be invisible to TCP-only scans.

```
sudo nmap -sU -n --top-ports 50 192.168.100.46 -oA udp_top50
```

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ sudo nmap -sU --top-ports 50 --reason --max-retries 3 192.168.100.46 -oA udp_top50_noscripts
Starting Nmap 7.98 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-02-28 09:02 -0500
Warning: 192.168.100.46 giving up on port because retransmission cap hit (3).
Nmap scan report for 192.168.100.46
Host is up, received arp-response (0.0025s latency).
Not shown: 34 open|filtered udp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE      REASON
53/udp    open  domain      udp-response ttl 64
67/udp    closed dhcps       port-unreach ttl 64
80/udp    closed http      port-unreach ttl 64
111/udp   open  rpcbind     udp-response ttl 64
136/udp   closed profile  port-unreach ttl 64
137/udp   open  netbios-ns  udp-response ttl 64
139/udp   closed netbios-ssn port-unreach ttl 64
445/udp   closed microsoft-ds port-unreach ttl 64
631/udp   closed ipp        port-unreach ttl 64
1646/udp  closed radacct  port-unreach ttl 64
2049/udp  open  nfs         udp-response ttl 64
2222/udp  closed msantipiracy port-unreach ttl 64
3456/udp  closed IISrpc-or-vat port-unreach ttl 64
5060/udp  closed sip     port-unreach ttl 64
49153/udp closed unknown  port-unreach ttl 64
49154/udp closed unknown  port-unreach ttl 64
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:71:14:98 (VMware)
```

Figure 6: UDP Scan (-sU) — ports 53, 111, 137, and 2049 confirmed open on UDP

1.6 Scan Comparison with ndiff

ndiff compares two saved Nmap XML output files and produces a difference report. Lines prefixed with a minus sign (-) appear only in the first scan; lines prefixed with a plus sign (+) appear only in the second. This confirms that the UDP scan revealed DNS, rpcbind, NetBIOS, and NFS services that were invisible to the TCP-only scan, validating the importance of multi-protocol reconnaissance.

```
ndiff essential_syn_noscripts.xml udp_top50_noscripts.xml | tee comparebetweenports.txt
```

```
+Nmap 7.98 scan initiated Sat Feb 28 09:02:04 2026 as: /usr/lib/nmap/nmap -sU
192.168.100.46, 00:0C:29:71:14:98:
-Not shown: 65505 closed ports
+Not shown: 34 open|filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE          VERSION
-21/tcp   open  ftp              vsftpd 2.3.4
-22/tcp   open  ssh              OpenSSH 4.7p1 Debian 8ubuntu1 (protocol 2.0)
-23/tcp   open  telnet           Linux telnetd
-25/tcp   open  smtp             Postfix smtpd
-53/tcp   open  domain           ISC BIND 9.4.2
+53/udp   open  domain
+67/udp   closed dhcpd
-80/tcp   open  http             Apache httpd 2.2.8 ((Ubuntu) DAV/2)
+80/udp   closed http
-111/tcp  open  rpcbind          2 (RPC #100000)
+111/udp  open  rpcbind
+136/udp  closed profile
+137/udp  open  netbios-ns
-139/tcp  open  netbios-ssn     Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
+139/udp  closed netbios-ssn
-445/tcp  open  netbios-ssn     Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
+445/udp  closed microsoft-ds
-512/tcp  open  exec             netkit-rsh rexecd
-513/tcp  open  login
-514/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
+631/udp  closed ipp
-1099/tcp open  java-rmi         GNU Classpath grmiregistry
-1524/tcp open  bindshell        Metasploitable root shell
+1646/udp closed radacct
-2049/tcp open  nfs              2-4 (RPC #100003)
+2049/udp open  nfs
-2121/tcp open  ftp              ProFTPD 1.3.1
+2222/udp closed msantipiracy
-3306/tcp open  mysql            MySQL 5.0.51a-3ubuntu5
+3456/udp closed IISrpc-or-vat
```

Figure 7: ndiff output comparing TCP SYN scan results UDP scan result

1.7 Summary of Findings

The combined TCP and UDP scans revealed a heavily exposed attack surface. The target was confirmed as Metasploitable 2.

The table below summarises the most significant services discovered.

Port	Service / Version	Protocol
21/tcp	vsftpd 2.3.4	TCP
22/tcp	OpenSSH 4.7p1	TCP
23/tcp	Linux telnetd	TCP
25/tcp	Postfix / SSLv2	TCP
80/tcp	Apache 2.2.8	TCP
139/445	Samba 3.0.20	TCP
1524/tcp	Metasploitable shell	TCP
3306/tcp	MySQL 5.0.51a	TCP
5900/tcp	VNC 3.3	TCP
53/udp	ISC BIND 9.4.2	UDP
2049/udp	NFS 2-4	UDP

SECTION 2 — BLUE TEAM: Detection and Log Analysis

2.1 Overview

The blue team perspective focuses on what a defender observes during the reconnaissance activity described in Section 1. Effective detection requires correlating multiple log sources simultaneously — no single tool sees the complete picture. multiple log sources — firewall, IDS, host-based logs, and network flow data to construct a complete picture of the attacker's activity.

2.2 IDS Alert (Suricata fast.log)

Suricata was active on the network segment during the scan. The fast.log output below shows a dense sequence of TCPv4 invalid checksum alerts generated in response to the Nmap SYN scan packets. The alerts fire at a rate of several per second, clearly distinguishing automated scanning behaviour from normal traffic. The source IP 192.168.100.38 and destination 192.168.100.46 are visible throughout the log, confirming the scan was detected at the IDS layer.




Figure 9: Windows Defender Firewall active on all profiles and Windows pfirewall.log

2.4 Zeek Network Logs

Zeek was deployed to capture and parse all traffic during the exercise. The conn.log table below records every observed connection attempt. Key indicators of port scanning are visible: source port 53422 remains constant across all entries, all durations are zero or near-zero, and the orig_bytes and resp_bytes fields are 0 for almost every entry confirming that no data was transferred.

```
/usr/bin/zeek -r ~/logs.pcap | cat conn.log
```

```

#fields ts uid id.orig_h id.orig_p id.resp_h id.resp_p proto service duration orig_bytes resp_bytes conn_state local_orig local_resp missed_byt
es history orig_pkts resp_pkts resp_ip_bytes tunnel_parents count count string bool bool count string count count count count set[string] local_resp missed_byt
1772281844.624402 CTR2n3Hr1HkLy2Cs 192.168.100.10 57737 192.168.1.172 7680 tcp - - - 4,000300 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1772281845.794872 C31ld118S0d18GSYh9 192.168.100.10 57735 192.168.1.105 7680 tcp - - - 50 T T 0 S 1 52 0 0 -
1772281845.794883 Ccuho2uUuAjDhSUS5 192.168.100.10 57736 192.168.1.44 7680 tcp - - - 50 T T 0 S 1 52 0 0 -
1772281845.884129 Cege501YkWzJzJQwbh 192.168.100.38 53400 192.168.100.46 57171 tcp - - 0.047868 0 0 SH T T 0 Fa 1 52 1 52
1772281845.343685 CFHTT7KAEyEW0tG9 192.168.100.13 5353 224.0.0.251 5353 udp dns - - 50 T F 0 D 1 89 0 0 -
1772281845.345765 CtTtGc1StRp7N3DQw1 192.168.100.13 5353 224.0.0.251 5353 udp dns - - 50 T F 0 D 1 109 0 0
1772281853.788969 CsDsoq31BxV5gKIJ34 192.168.100.10 57735 192.168.1.105 7680 tcp - - - 50 T T 0 S 1 52 0 0 -
1772281853.789468 Cd26nc41uyQrdncz25 192.168.100.10 57736 192.168.1.44 7680 tcp - - - 50 T T 0 S 1 52 0 0 -
1772281853.882501 CuBF5r2P8CZ7t10KHk 192.168.100.10 57738 10.58.164.215 7680 tcp - - 3.056556 0 0 S0 T T 0 S 3 156 0 0
1772281856.642140 Cc1K10241X34tctF1 192.168.100.10 57737 192.168.1.172 7680 tcp - - - 50 T T 0 S 1 52 0 0 -
1772281860.966836 CqgcwF328DBotGec1 192.168.100.10 57738 10.58.164.215 7680 tcp - - - 50 T T 0 S 1 52 0 0 -
1772281868.977194 CVghn135FcxjYtjPkbb 192.168.100.10 57738 10.58.164.215 7680 tcp - - - 50 T T 0 S 1 52 0 0 -
1772281865.391568 Ct8FLM2Qy5SHV5j5gJ 192.168.100.13 5353 224.0.0.251 5353 udp dns - - 50 T F 0 D 1 89 0 0 -
1772281865.391576 CvgeX81Wryzn1AWdab 192.168.100.13 5353 224.0.0.251 5353 udp dns - - 50 T F 0 D 1 109 0 0
1772281878.807437 CBD5wK1dVpMnPlqY2 192.168.100.10 57739 192.168.50.226 7680 tcp - - 2.993467 0 0 S0 T T 0 S 3 156 0 0
1772281878.807971 CCKHgiolwTgc8Pwg 192.168.100.10 57740 10.102.106.27 7680 tcp - - 2.992940 0 0 S0 T T 0 S 3 156 0 0
1772281854.595966 CmXEFU15GPKGim8r36 192.168.100.7 5353 224.0.0.251 5353 udp dns 13.890456 232 0 S0 T F 0 D 4 344 0 0
1772281854.595954 C1utSgoMhYSDVR37 192.168.100.7 5353 224.0.0.251 5353 udp dns 13.075387 232 0 S0 T F 0 D 4 42
1772281881.615123 CKHspw2IKP4LtbNjh 192.168.100.10 57741 192.168.5.61 7680 tcp - - 2.993645 0 0 S0 T T 0 S 3 156 0 0
1772281885.789959 CPt55F450T1d1stFcc 192.168.100.10 57739 192.168.50.226 7680 tcp - - - 50 T T 0 S 1 52 0 0 -
1772281885.789966 CVyqAkrAEVKJ7v85 192.168.100.10 57740 10.102.106.27 7680 tcp - - - 50 T T 0 S 1 52 0 0 -
1772281888.612643 C3V1x11F7c18G1av1 192.168.100.10 57741 192.168.5.61 7680 tcp - - - 50 T T 0 S 1 52 0 0 -
1772281885.371610 Cr7hoE1JGhHvLx2P3 192.168.100.13 5353 224.0.0.251 5353 udp dns - - 50 T F 0 D 1 89 0 0 -
1772281885.371880 CAmr1W39dg1gdq4bY1 192.168.100.13 5353 224.0.0.251 5353 udp dns - - 50 T F 0 D 1 109 0 0
1772281893.818428 Ck6ygo3d1YwMfGape 192.168.100.10 57739 192.168.50.226 7680 tcp - - - 50 T T 0 S 1 52 0 0 -
1772281893.818435 C116663192Hx5zwhj 192.168.100.10 57740 10.102.106.27 7680 tcp - - - 50 T T 0 S 1 52 0 0 -
1772281893.929708 Ct3ZUT5QVunGce26 192.168.100.10 57742 172.18.70.199 7680 tcp - - 3.027175 0 0 S0 T T 0 S 3 156 0 0
1772281896.646388 CnyQw4l1q3KP1gd4k 192.168.100.10 57741 192.168.5.61 7680 tcp - - - 50 T T 0 S 1 52 0 0 -
1772281900.961026 CjEup16n51F80Eac 192.168.100.10 57742 172.18.70.199 7680 tcp - - - 50 T T 0 S 1 52 0 0 -
1772281848.198626 C1N8Ty6CkxvQ3hg2 192.168.100.10 138 192.168.100.255 138 udp - - - 50 T T 0 D 1 229 0 0 -
1772281853.668053 Cpqs3M1fkky1gQ3lu8 192.168.100.38 43013 194.225.150.25 123 udp ntp - - 48 48 SF T F 0 Dd 1 76 1 76
1772281905.384211 CZ7A163QxAn3Ltoffb 192.168.100.13 5353 224.0.0.251 5353 udp dns - - 50 T F 0 D 1 89 0 0 -
    
```

Figure 11: Zeek conn.log

Zeek Connection States — What They Mean During a Scan	
S0	SYN sent, no response — port is filtered or host unreachable
REJ	Port closed — target sent RST; probe rejected
RSTO	Scanner sent RST after receiving SYN/ACK — half-open scan
SF	Full connection established — port is open and service responded
SH	SYN sent, SYN/ACK received, half-open (no final ACK from scanner)

2.5 Wireshark Packet Capture Analysis

The Wireshark capture confirms the half-open SYN scan pattern at the packet level. The scanner at 192.168.100.38 sends SYN packets to sequential destination ports on 192.168.100.46. When an open port (such as port 445) responds with SYN/ACK, the scanner immediately sends RST rather than completing the handshake the

defining characteristic of an Nmap -sS scan. Closed ports respond with RST/ACK directly. The rapid succession of packets within milliseconds confirms automated rather than human activity.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
483	48.226127203	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
484	48.226268518	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 1723 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
485	48.226363100	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 554 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
486	48.226459207	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 3306 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
487	48.226545052	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 3389 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
488	48.226613322	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	60	445 → 53422 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
489	48.226635774	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	54	53422 → 445 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0
490	48.226729645	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 256 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
491	48.226797407	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
492	48.226880295	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	60	1723 → 53422 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
493	48.226887316	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	60	554 → 53422 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
494	48.226965441	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 113 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
495	48.227033406	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	60	3306 → 53422 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
496	48.227045089	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	54	53422 → 3306 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0
497	48.227148206	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 995 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
498	48.227247868	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	60	3389 → 53422 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
499	48.227288200	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 135 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
500	48.227524593	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	60	256 → 53422 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
501	48.227532326	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	60	443 → 53422 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
502	48.227771170	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	60	113 → 53422 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
503	48.227790573	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	60	995 → 53422 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
504	48.227953223	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	60	135 → 53422 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
505	48.228422884	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 21 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
506	48.228505580	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 199 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
507	48.228758443	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 1025 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
508	48.228875477	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 993 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
509	48.228909206	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	60	21 → 53422 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
510	48.228924038	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	54	53422 → 21 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0
511	48.228999420	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	60	199 → 53422 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
512	48.229057734	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 53 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
513	48.229121432	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	60	1025 → 53422 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
514	48.229159326	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 25 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
515	48.229205957	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 23 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
516	48.229270468	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	60	993 → 53422 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
517	48.229378257	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	60	53 → 53422 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
518	48.229389128	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	54	53422 → 53 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0
519	48.229490517	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 8888 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
520	48.229531662	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
521	48.229598409	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 1720 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
522	48.229628886	192.168.100.46	192.168.100.38	TCP	60	25 → 53422 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
523	48.229635896	192.168.100.46	192.168.100.38	TCP	60	23 → 53422 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
524	48.229647071	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	54	53422 → 25 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0
525	48.229671860	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	54	53422 → 23 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0
526	48.229761464	192.168.100.46	192.168.100.38	TCP	60	8888 → 53422 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
527	48.229825772	192.168.100.46	192.168.100.38	TCP	60	22 → 53422 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
528	48.229832782	192.168.100.46	192.168.100.38	TCP	60	1720 → 53422 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
529	48.229843754	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	54	53422 → 22 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0
530	48.229943416	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 110 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
531	48.230024283	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 111 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
532	48.230112872	192.168.100.38	192.168.100.46	TCP	58	53422 → 5900 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460

Figure 12: Wireshark packet capture

2.6 RITA Beacon Analysis

RITA (Real Intelligence Threat Analytics) analysed the Zeek logs for beaconing behaviour — regular automated outbound communication that may indicate a compromised host. The output below shows that RITA flagged communication from 192.168.100.38 to the external IP 194.225.150.25 on UDP port 123 (NTP) with a severity of High and a beacon score of 99.50%.

```
rita import ~/zeek_logs/ purple_lab_dataset
```




Figure 13: RITA dashboard

Blue Team Detection Summary	
IDS (Suricata)	Detected hundreds of alerts during SYN scan
Firewall	Detected DROP entries visible in pfirewall.log
Zeek conn.log	Detected zero-duration connections across sequential ports
Wireshark	Confirmed SYN/RST half-open handshake pattern visible
RITA	Detected 99.50% beacon score on NTP traffic
UDP Scan	Partial Zeek logged, IDS had fewer alerts

SECTION 3 — PURPLE TEAM: Detection Gap Analysis

3.1 Purpose of the Purple Team Exercise

The purple team phase brings red and blue team findings together. Rather than operating in isolation, both sides compare what the attacker did against what the defender detected. The objective is to identify gaps — attacks that succeeded without triggering any alert and to improve detection coverage as a result.

3.2 Detection Coverage

Red Team Action	Detection Status
TCP SYN scan (-sS)	Detected — Suricata + Wireshark
TCP Connect scan (-sT)	Detected — Firewall + Zeek
UDP scan (-sU)	Partial — Zeek logged, fewer IDS hits
OS detection (-O)	Partially detected
Version detection (-sV)	Often missed
NTP beaconing	Detected by RITA (99.50%)

SECTION 4 — CONCLUSION

Summary

This laboratory exercise demonstrated the complete reconnaissance lifecycle against a vulnerable target host. The red team successfully enumerated over 30 open services using a structured sequence of Nmap scans. Blue team monitoring confirmed that TCP SYN scanning is reliably detected when Suricata rules and firewall logging are properly configured. Zeek and Wireshark provided packet-level and flow-level confirmation of the half-open scan pattern. RITA detected high-confidence beaconing in the Zeek logs with a 99.50% score. The purple team exercise identified UDP scanning and service version detection as persistent blind spots requiring rule additions and baselining work.

The central lesson is that no single tool provides complete visibility. Effective defence requires IDS, firewall logging, network flow analysis, and behavioural analytics working together . The screenshots in this report demonstrate that monitoring was active and functional throughout the exercise, with evidence of scan detection across four independent tool categories.